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ABSTRACT
The study discusses the three roles of normative assumption in the
theory and practice of innovation management: (1) they define the
value of innovation, (2) specify its luck, and (3) determine some
goals and methodologies of managing the luck of innovations.
The crucial questions of the investigation are as follows: What
does ‘luck’ mean in theories of innovation management?, and What
is luck in the practice of innovation management? The conceptual
analyses present logical links which occur between the normative
premises of some canonical theories of metaethics and
definitions of luck. In the context of these analyses the study
discusses some prerequisites for responsible decisions relating to
innovations. The paper illustrates some ways of using
philosophical methods in the theory of innovation management.
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Introduction
Normative assumptions specify a hierarchy of values and criteria of assessments. These
premises guide political and economic decisions, yet find little analysis in economics
where a neo-positivistic tendency led to a marginalisation of philosophical problems
(MacRae 1973, 27). The study presents the three roles of normative assumption in
theory and practice of innovation management as follows: (1) they define the value of
innovation, (2) specify its luck, (3) and determine the goals and methodologies of mana-
ging the luck of innovations. This study aims to show how normative assumptions deter-
mine the idea of luck and the practice of managing luck of innovation. The present
conceptual analysis will carve out the relationship between three kinds of concepts,
which are as follows: (1) normative assumptions in some theories of metaethics (norma-
tive relativism, absolutism, egoism, universalism, utilitarianism, liberalism, personalism,
eudemonism in their various versions), (2) conceptions of success, utility, and efficiency,
and (3) definitions of the luck of innovations. This article underscores the importance of
philosophical analyses in the theory and practice of innovation management and the
roles which normative assumptions play in decision making regarding innovations. In
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the present paper, I do not embrace a particular value theory: The spectrum of normative
assumptions will be taken into account without opting for any of them.
The present study discusses the typical moral issues of moral luck related to moral
agency and responsibility only briefly, as there are already studies of these topics in the
theory of innovation management (Grinbaum and Groves 2013; Moore 1999; Owen and
Pansera 2019; Pavie 2014; Sand 2018b). Likewise, methodologies for predicting luck
shall not be discussed in detail. The study takes up the primary task of specifying the
role of normative assumptions in identifying, predicting and managing the luck of inno-
vations. The key questions of this approach are as follows:What does ‘luck’mean in theories
of innovation management? What is luck in the practice of innovation management?
The problem and state of research
Varying definitions of luck can be found in the philosophy of innovation literature
(Parnell and Dent 2009, 1002). In the present study, the term ‘luck’ designates an
event and the function of activities which lead towards this event. Luck happens when
an action and its doer is successful despite her limits of control over the success. In
this context, the term ‘success’ has a broad meaning. It does not only refer to an increase
in financial or other economic profits. It designates a totality of effects, which is highly
appreciated by the agent or some other entities. Therefore, this conception of success
depends on the value preferences of the person who states (evaluates) the consequences.
According to this definition, the aim or purpose of the agent may have nothing to do with
her success (successful results), because it can happen independently from her intentions.
‘Luck’ may also designate the function of actions which are successful despite the
aforementioned limits of control. In the causal model of reality (where each event has
its cause), one may explain this function by the chain of causes (causal relations,
causal ‘mechanisms’) that have led the action towards its success despite the limits of
agential control. Since the command over the success is gradual, luck may also have
degrees – actions may need greater or lesser degrees of luck to become successful.
Pure (maximal) luck takes place when the action is a success, yet the agent has had no
control over it. If an agent has full control over the success of an action, it requires no
luck to be successful (Collins and Hansen 2011, 8). The level of luck is proportional,
and the level of control is inversely proportional to the degree of the limit of knowledge
(epistemic limit) and agency (control limit). The constraints of knowledge (epistemic
limits) are constitutive for luck when an action succeeds despite the lack of awareness
of the agent, whereby at the moment of decision-making, the agent either does not
have full knowledge about the causes or the nature of its future success (Rudy-Hiller
2018). In the former case, luck means that the agent does not have sufficient information
about the means that may guarantee the future success of the action at hand. In the latter
case, the agent succeeds in a different than intended manner. For example, John Pember-
ton did not anticipate that he would create a beverage (Coca-Cola) when he was working
on a cure for a headache (Bodden 2019). Regarding agency (control limit), an action is
lucky when the agent cannot fully control the causes which contribute to the success
(Nagel 1979, 24–38). This aspect of luck comprises resultant, circumstantial, constitutive
and causal luck, as specified by Thomas Nagel (1979). According to this definition of
luck, an investment, change, or innovation is lucky when it is thriving despite the
S108 J. F. JACKO
aforementioned limits of knowledge and agency of their creators (for example, designers,
investors, producers). This conception of luck is in line with the now classical notion of
moral luck as defined by Nagel (1979) and Bernard Williams (1981). However, these
thinkers deal with moral luck, which happens, when actions are morally right despite
the limits of agential control. In this context, ‘success’ means moral success, which
occurs when actions foster or promote values. The idea of moral success depends on nor-
mative assumptions, which specify those values (Zimmerman 2001, 2019). For example,
the moral success (rightness) of an action is the utility of its consequences in the utilitar-
ian perspective (Alchian 1953; Barbera, Hammond, and Seidl 1998); according to ethical
personalism, the moral success of actions consists in respecting human dignity and
freedom of individuals (Kelly 2005; Sen 1990; Williams and Bengtsson 2016). The oppo-
site of moral success is moral failure (wrongness) of actions, which takes place when they
disrespect or destroy intrinsic values. In this study, ‘success’ has a broader meaning,
which embraces moral success but can also mean any highly appreciated consequences
of the action.
One may distinguish good luck from bad luck (Nagel 1979, 25). Concerning inno-
vations, ‘good luck’ is defined as above, and ‘bad luck’ means the failure of enterprises,
which is a situation beyond the control of their ‘key actors’ (Collins and Hansen 2011,
8). In the present article, the term ‘luck’ without any adjective designates good luck.
The study argues that distinguishing between good and bad luck requires adopting
some normative assumptions.
We have, thus, specified luck in terms of the relations between the agent, causality and
success. For example, ‘subjective luck’ designates the relationship between the agent and
success. In this meaning, actions are lucky, when acts (perceptions, intentions, incli-
nations, emotions, decisions) of the agent lead towards success despite her inherent
limits of control about it (Parnell and Dent 2009, 1005–1009). The notion of ‘objective
luck’ may designate the relation between causality and (complete or partial) ignorance
about it (Parnell and Dent 2009, 1002–1006). This kind of luck happens when the
causes of success are not fully understood (Parnell and Dent 2009, 3). It can be the ignor-
ance of the agent or some observers of her success at hand. ‘Ignorance’may also designate
gaps in scientific knowledge. In this case, ‘luck’means that success does not have a scien-
tific explanation. ‘Luck’ may also refer to the relationship between the success and its
probability: In this meaning, innovations are lucky when they are thriving despite a
high risk of failure (Navarro 2019; Yang 2019).
Success and luck are different things. Luck involves both success and a dose of uncer-
tainty. Success accompanies luck because of their conceptual and conditional relations.
Definitions of luck display their conceptual relation: Luck is specified it in term of
success. The idea of success is in the definiens of the definitions of luck because the
success of innovations is a precondition for their luck (if assuming that there are no
lucky innovations, which are not successful or unsuccessful innovations that are
lucky). Innovation may be partially successful and partially unlucky (have bad luck) or
partially lucky and partially unsuccessful when it attains some success, fails to attain
some other success, and its creators cannot fully control these effects.
It is disputable, whether innovations are ever successful without a dose of luck, for
there may be innovations which are so meticulously planned that they do not carry
any significant dose of risk of failure and do not seem to require any luck to become
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successful. However, due to our limits of knowledge and control over the future, every
enterprise carries some risk. For example, oil-related investments were safe until the
crisis in 2020, when, contrary to forecasts, oil prices fell sharply due to the unpredictable
circumstance of the pandemic of 2020. Analogously, any innovation may become unsuc-
cessful due to unpredictable or unpredicted circumstances, which may be very unlikely,
but are possible. Because of human limits of knowledge and control about the future,
innovations are considered risky by definition (Perrin 2002, 14). Only in an ideal situ-
ation (when the agent has perfect knowledge about and full control of the factors that
cause the success) innovations need no luck to be successful. In reality, the success of
innovations often or perhaps always requires some luck.
Some definitions specify innovation in terms of its success in attaining some goals. For
example, innovation is as follows:
(D 1) ‘ … the process of bringing something new into the world, through a combination of
intellectual and practical ingenuity’. (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 119)
(D 2) ‘ …more than a new idea or an invention. An innovation requires implementation,
either by being put into active use or by being made available for use by other parties,
firms, individuals or organisations’. (OECD 2019, 44)
(D 3) ‘ … something 1) new with [a] high-level of originality, 2) in whatever area 3) that also
breaks into (or obtains a foothold in) society, often via the market, and 4) means something
revolutionary for people.’ (Frankelius 2009, 49)
These definitions state prerequisites for calling an artefact ‘innovation’ or ‘innovative’
and they consider (a threshold of) success a condition that innovations satisfy, such as
bringing something new into the world, implementation or obtaining a foothold in
society. Such innovations may be unsuccessful in some other respect, for example,
when they do not give revenue to the producer.1
The aforementioned definitions are descriptive because they allow us to state that
something is innovative without evaluating it. However, they would also comprise novel-
ties that are (in a social perception or objective sense) useless or harmful. For example,
some new illegal drugs may fulfil definitions 1–3. In order to exclude such novelties from
the scope of the concept of innovation, some authors introduce the normative definitions
by indicating values that innovations promote (in the various meanings of ‘value’ and
‘promote,’ which this study will discuss). For example, innovation is:
(D 4) ‘… a new or changed entity; realising or redistributing value…Novelty and value are
relative to and determined by the perception of the organisation and interested parties’.
(IAIP n.d.)
(D 5) ‘turning an idea into a solution that adds value from a customer’s perspective’ (Skilli-
corn, Nick. ‘What Is Innovation? 15 Experts Share Their Innovation Definition’. Idea to
Value. 18 March 2016. https://www.ideatovalue.com/inno/nickskillicorn/2016/03/
innovation-15-experts-share-innovation-definition/)
(D 6) ‘ … process of translating an idea or invention into a good or service that creates value
for which customers will pay.’ (‘Innovation’ n.d.)
(D7) ‘ … the process through which economic and social value is extracted from knowledge
through the generation, development, and implementation… .’ (CBC 2019)
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The function of protecting and promoting values is called their ‘utility’ in this text.
According to the normative definitions, novelties that do not play this function are
not innovations, even if they attain the goals, which the descriptive definitions indicate.
Normative definitions specify the success of innovations in terms of their utility.
All the above definitions (D 1–7) specify innovations by pointing to some success.
Therefore, luck plays a role in making innovations count as such: projects of innovation
(often or always) require some external factors to become innovations, namely, luck, in
order to attain the success specified in the definitions.
The definitions mentioned above do not exclude and partially overlap with each other.
However, descriptive definitions (D 1–3) differ from normative definitions (D 4–7): The
descriptive definitions do not indicate any value of innovations. Normative definitions
specify them in terms of values.
Analogously, one can define the luck of innovations either in a value-neutral (descrip-
tive) or moral (normative) way. In descriptive terms, lucky innovation takes place, when
it effectively pursues goals set by someone (their creators, stakeholders, customers, a
society, or someone else, who has the authority to decide on these goals) and its creators
cannot fully control this function of innovation. The study discusses this idea of luck with
the example of ethical egoism and utilitarianism in metaethics. In normative terms, lucky
innovations protect and promote values despite the aforementioned limits of agential
control. In this meaning of ‘luck’, innovation may not satisfy expectations of its creators,
stakeholders or interested parties but be successful and lucky in terms of advocating
values. Further sections discuss this idea of luck in the context of normative assumptions
of ethical liberalism and eudaemonism in metaethics.
The normative definitions (D 4–7) are general – they require utility from innovations
without specifying values and their nature. Their generality is their advantage, which
allows acknowledgement of the success of innovations from various value preferences.
However, in order to distinguish value-neutral goals from values (in these definitions),
one needs to define them as distinct from other aims of human intentions. If the norma-
tive definitions do not presuppose any broader theory of value, they are open to contrast-
ing interpretations, according to two counter normative assumptions of metaethics –
normative relativism or absolutism (anti-relativism), which suggest divergent ideas of
success and luck of innovations.
Normative relativism in metaethics is the assumption that something is or has value
because someone (an individual, a group) appreciates it; there is no intrinsic value that is
precious independently of human acts (intentions, appreciations, evaluations). In a rela-
tivistic theory, the term ‘value’ means the fact that someone appreciates something, and
this word denotes the (intentional) object of this act (Brandt 1967; Garnett 1944; Gowans
2012; Westacott 2012; Zimmerman 2001, 2019). In the context of this assumption, nor-
mative definitions do not significantly differ from descriptive definitions of innovation
concerning the idea of value: All of them specify innovations in terms of some success
in attaining some goals, which may become values when someone (an individual or a
group) intends or appreciates them. Contrary, according to the assumption of normative
absolutism in metaethics, some values are intrinsic, in that they are precious regardless of
the fact whether someone appreciates them (Brandt 1967; Garnett 1944; Gowans 2012;
Westacott 2012; Zimmerman 2001, 2019). In this context, normative definitions of inno-
vation specify the requirement of ethical success, which descriptive definitions do not
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embrace: Innovations change the world for the better by protecting and promoting
intrinsic values. Accordingly, ‘luck’ of innovations means their moral luck, as it relates
to these values.
These two counter-assumptions (of normative relativism and absolutism) may affect
identifying innovations. For example: Are new methods of discrimination innovations
according to D4? To answer this question, one should answer the following question of
metaethics: Can value perceptions be wrong? According to normative relativism, the
answer to this question is negative. In this view, something may simultaneously be valu-
able and invaluable depending on the perceptions of the individuals and groups, who
perceive it. Consequently, according to this assumption, a new method of discrimination
may simultaneously be and not be innovation depending on value preferences of ‘organ-
isations’ and ‘interested parties,’ which evaluate it.
On the contrary, according to the assumption of normative absolutism, some values
are precious regardless of their perceptions. Therefore, ‘organisations’ and ‘interested
parties’ may be wrong by appreciating something when it is not worth realising.
Suppose the proponents of normative absolutism assume (the normative assumption)
that the fundamental human rights are the principal good (which is more precious
than any other goals of action). In that case, this premise leads to the conclusion that
no methods of discrimination (which, by its definition, violates the rights) can be pre-
cious and anybody who appreciates them is wrong. Consequently, they cannot be inno-
vations, according to D4.
Many advocates of normative relativism and anti-relativism in ethics accordingly
accept that the idea of success is not value-neutral and success assessment requires
some criteria which follow some orderly hierarchy of values and logically ordered nor-
mative assumptions (Brandt 1967; Brown 2008; Garnett 1944; Gowans 2012; Hollis
and Lukes 1982; Jarvie 1983; Swoyer 2014; Westacott 2012). Some authors suggest aban-
doning value-neutral conception of success in economics and introduce an ethical idea of
utility or efficiency which embraces values (Anderson 1995; Brown 2010; Coughlin 1991;
Davila and Epstein 2014; Enderle and Murphy 2015; Fried, Knox Lovell, and Schmidt
2008; Hall and Winsten 1959; Hanekamp 2007; Mintzberg 1982; Minus 1993; Moran
2016; Segerstrom 1990; Segnestam Larsson and Brandsen 2016; Sen 1977, 1988, 1995; Sti-
glitz 2014; Walshe 2009; Wight 2017). In this view, ‘success’ and ‘luck’may mean various
things depending on the normative assumptions, which specify these values. This text
presents a variety of theories of value to show how they determine the meaning of
‘success,’ and specify the idea of luck.
Authors varyingly specify relations between values and innovations. For example,
according to the post-phenomenological approach of Peter-Paul Verbeek, technologies
(including innovations) may have intrinsic value or disvalue when they are conducive
to morally good or bad intentions and morally right or wrong actions (Verbeek 2011).
The proponents of the humanistic approach indicate the intentional relations between
innovations and values as follows: Innovations are morally neutral means of action
(they have no intrinsic value), yet may relate to intrinsic values when utilised as instru-
ments of human decisions and actions (Grinbaum and Groves 2013; Owen and Pansera
2019; Sand 2018b).
The requirement of success sets out the temporal limit of knowledge about the luck of
innovations: It is possible to know the luck of past innovations in terms of their past
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success and limits of control of their creators; it is not possible to anticipate with certainty
the luck of future innovations (Lösch et al. 2019). Past-oriented (backwards-looking)
approaches to innovations, e.g. the theory of innovation in the economic long-wave the-
ories (Keklik 2018; Kleinknecht 1987; Mensch 1979; Schumpeter 1983; Walshe 2009)
analyse the past innovations and their success. Future-oriented (forward-looking)
approaches investigate serendipity (unintended inventions, discoveries or innovations),
the responsibility of innovation managers for the future, the need to manage luck’s
impact and the role of ethics in the practice of forward-looking innovation management,
set out with an acknowledgement of the limits of future knowledge (Dickel and Schrape
2017; Grinbaum and Groves 2013; Lösch, Heil, and Schneider 2017; Owen and Pansera
2019; Sand 2018a, 2018b).
Both past and future-oriented approaches to innovation face the problem of justifying
the definition of success. The following question may express this problem:What are the
reasons to set goals, whose attainment is the success of innovations? The proponents of
past-oriented theories may answer that the definition of innovation is stipulative,
while also specifying the subject matter of research, as well as being a research approach
that does not require a justification. However, it is not the answer to the question in the
future-oriented practice of innovation management, as it requires decisions about values
that innovations should protect or advocate on a local or global scale. Consequently, the
definition of success in those approaches is normative by default – it relates to values and
requires specifying and justifying normative assumptions.
Post-phenomenological approaches attempt to justify normative assumptions by phe-
nomenological analysis (Verbeek 2011). Some authors suggest justifying these premises
by a social agreement (consensus) about ethical (Enderle andMurphy 2015; Moran 2016)
and social (Bechtold, Capari, and Gudowsky 2017; Mintzberg 1982, 104; Stiglitz 2014)
values with a particular concern for social responsibility (Carroll 2000; Grinbaum and
Groves 2013; Melé 2008; Owen and Pansera 2019; Roa 2007; Schomberg and Hankins
2019), sustainability (Matsumoto et al. 2012; Raman et al. 2015) and ecology (Daly
and Townsend 1996).
Although subject-related literature does not directly address the problem of the nor-
mative assumptions of the definition of innovation luck, many studies address problems
of this nature in the theory and practice of innovation management. Some publications
display how the meaning of ‘innovation’ changes, depending on the context of the phi-
losophical assumptions of economics (Jonsson 2016; Keklik 2018). Some authors discuss
the impact of some normative assumptions on the practice of innovation management
(Bechtold, Capari, and Gudowsky 2017; MacRae 1973; Segnestam Larsson and Brandsen
2016). However, the problem usually appears in publications that do not directly deal
with the subject of innovation. For instance, authors show the role of normative assump-
tions in economics (Anderson 1995; Baiman 2016; Brown 2010; Dennis 2012; Fleurbaey
2016; Piderit 1993; Sen 1988; White 2012) and management (Anderson 1997; Bernthal
1962; Eldred 2011; Freeman, Gilbert, and Hartman 1988; Pruzan 1998).
Some approaches illustrate the impact of normative assumptions to risk evaluation,
and in this way, they indirectly introduce ethical questions about luck into the theory
of decision and management (Brunk, Haworth, and Lee 2006; Ericson and Doyle
2003; Frenkel, Hommel, and Rudolf 2004; Haimes 2015; Keeney 1996; Kuipers 1994;
Luetge and Jauernig 2013; Parsons 2001).
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Some studies present the perspective of incorporating luck into strategic management
(Collins and Hansen 2011; Parnell and Dent 2009). However, they do not discuss the
impact of normative assumptions on the idea of luck and the strategies to manage it.
Recently, discussions within the theory of innovation have triggered studies referring
to the paradox of moral responsibility for innovation in situations where its creator
does not have full control over its success and effects (Grinbaum and Groves 2013;
Moore 1999; Owen and Pansera 2019; Pavie 2014; Sand 2018b, 2020a, 2020b; Sand
and Jongsma 2020).
The terminology: ‘value preferences,’ ‘normative assumptions,’ and
‘utility’
In the present paper, the term ‘hierarchy of values’ signifies value-preferences (Hansson
and Grüne-Yanoff 2018). They are decisions, attitudes, and inclinations of preferring
something over something else or ranking it higher. Normative assumptions conceptu-
alise (define) value preferences by articulating the hierarchy of values, by specifying the
nature of the principal (the most precious) good (value) and (conditional or intentional)
relations between this good and the remaining goods (values). Normative assumptions
are conceptions. They are not value preferences which are facts (of human decisions
and attitudes). Normative assumptions may specify value preferences in two ways.
They may conceptualise the existing value preferences (of an individual or a group) or
specify a pattern of expected (right, good, moral) value preferences which should take
place. For example, organisations may manage their organisational culture and the
value preferences of their members by setting normative assumptions in their
‘mission,’ ‘vision’ or ‘ethical code’ (Cunningham and de Quidt 2016; Segnestam
Larsson and Brandsen 2016).
In this paper, the terms ‘utility’ and ‘profit’ mean the instrumental value of inno-
vations: They are useful (have the value of utility) or profitable when they provide
more benefits than losses. Further analyses distinguish profit from the utility (stipulative
distinction). A profit is a proportion between the benefits and losses of one type (for
example, financial) and for a specified entity (individual, group, organisation). The
term ‘utility’ means that in all relevant aspects the sum of benefits is greater than the
sum of losses.
The term ‘utility’ alludes to the consequentialist ethics of utilitarianism (Driver 2014;
Marseille and Kahn 2019; Witztum and Young 2013). In economics, the value of utility
may have the name of ‘efficiency’(Mintzberg 1982). Ethical theories specify the relevant
aspects of utility assessment by answering to the following questions: Whose profits and
losses are relevant for the utility accruing from innovations? What do the benefits and losses
involve? What are the proper methods of predicting the future utility of innovations? The
following three sections discuss these questions. Answers to these questions, as shown
below, determine divergent conceptions of luck.
The bearers of utility
Within organisations, the utility (or efficiency) assessment measurements usually refer to
an organisation or its business and operational units. However, it may also be for other
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entities. A different one may be the utility accruing from innovations for their creators,
for the organisation that avails of it, as well as its investors, stakeholders, customers and
society itself. Therefore, to specify the utility of innovations, it is necessary to answer the
following question:Whose profits and losses are relevant for the utility accruing from inno-
vations? The answers to this question are normative because they select people whose
well-being should be advocated. The following positions are mutually exclusive: I, my
group (ethical egoism) or every person (ethical universalism).
According to theories of ethical egoism, the action is useful (efficient, morally right,
successful), when it produces results that maximise the interests of an individual (a
person, organisation) or a group, even at the expense of others (Shaver 2019). In this
view, success and luck are relative to the interests and preferences of some individual
or group, e.g. for the creators of innovation, its users, investors or other parties: inno-
vation is successful for someone when it is profitable for this person; it is lucky when
its creators do not have full control over this profit.
Moderate (‘enlightened’) theories of ethical egoism (such as the ‘invisible hand’-theory
of Adam Smith) suggest that decisions of a rational egoist result in socially useful activi-
ties as pursuing one’s self-interest in the long run term ‘automatically’ furthers the inter-
ests of others. This stance inspired some representatives of utilitarianism to abandon
ethical egoism and substitute it with the normative assumption of ethical universalism,
which is now associated with utilitarianism. It is
the position that… an act or rule of action is right if and only if it is, or probably is, con-
ducive to at least as great a balance of good over evil in the universe as a whole than an
alternative would be… (Frankena 1973, 15–16)
For example, some practices of ‘corporate social responsibility’(Melé 2008), ‘sustain-
able development’ (Matsumoto et al. 2012) follow the assumption of utilitarianism
and the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test translates this into the methodology of economics.
In this notion of utility, innovation is successful when it is conducive to ‘the greatest
possible balance of good over evil in the universe’, whereas innovation is lucky
when it fulfils this task despite its creators’ limits of control over this function of
innovation.
Some authors supplement ethical universalism with some additional normative
(deontological, absolutist) assumptions about a principal good, which is to be
unconditionally respected, because it is more precious than other goods, regardless of
their quantity. For instance, social liberalism in metaethics is the assumption that
the principal good is the freedom of the individuals, and utility of changes is in their
promotion of this good (Kelly 2005). Aristotle identifies the principal good with
human development – the fulfilment (eudaimonia, εὐδαιμονία in Greek) of the most pre-
cious possibilities of humans. The theories relating to his eudemonism define utility in
terms of the well-being (eudemonia) of individuals (Brink 2014; Crisp 2016;
Kraut 2016). These exemplary anti-egoistic concepts have set some general standards,
which innovations should meet. According to them, innovations are not successful
and therefore, cannot be lucky when they violate the principal good. This notion of
utility requires a multi-criteria of utility evaluation, which the following sections
will discuss (Anderson 1995, 190–192; Fleurbaey 2016; Frankena 1973; Piderit 1993,
284–286; Shaver 2019).
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Human needs and luck of satisfying them
One may define the success of innovations in terms of human needs as follows: Inno-
vations are successful when they conduce to the satisfaction of human needs. According
to this definition, an innovation is lucky when it plays this role, and its creators do not
have full control over this function. One may specify this definition according to the pos-
itions of either ethical egoism, universalism or normative absolutism in metaethics, as
specified in the previous sections.
Philosophical theories propose two contrasting answers to the following question: Is
every need worth satisfying? According to normative relativism, each need of individuals
is worth satisfying, if they appreciate it. This stance has multiple variants. For instance,
under the individualist and decisionistic version of normative relativism, the needs of
people are the products of their decisions. Jean-Paul Sartre in the first period of his
works (in Being and Nothingness) presents this stance. In his notion, every decision
has an aim; its achievement is a human need (Anderson 2002; Flynn 2013; Heter
2006, 75–117). Therefore, in this view, successful innovations satisfy needs, which indi-
viduals appreciate; whereas innovations are lucky when their creators do not have full
control over this success.
In the view of normative absolutism, not every need is worth satisfying. For example,
Aristotle distinguished real needs from apparent needs. The fulfilment of real needs is con-
ducive to the eudaemonia – they are worth satisfying. There are also apparent (delusional,
illusory) needs, whose fulfilment does not serve human development. If satisfying them
destroys the eudaemonia of the agent or someone else, they are not worth satisfying (Jaya-
palan 1999; Kraut 2016; Veatch 2003). In this context, one may define the success and luck
of innovation as follows: successful innovation satisfies needs that are worth satisfying;
innovations are lucky when their creators do not have full control over this success.
The stances mentioned above (normative relativism and anti-relativism) may have an
impact on the manner of identifying the luck of innovations. Consider the following
example: A producer creates a new refreshing drink. However, the product is unexpect-
edly and unforeseen by the producer addictive. Consumers were informed about the
addiction risk, and the product brings revenue to the firm.
According to normative relativism, this product is a successful innovation as it is new
and satisfies the needs of clients. The addictive function of the product is its good luck,
as it increases the demand for this product. The addiction is not bad luck for the consu-
mers, because when they decide to become addicted, it is their new ‘need’. On the contrary,
for example, in the context of the theory of eudemonism, this product cannot be lucky as it
evokes addiction, which restricts the eudaimonia (Blecker et al. 2006; Donohue 2006). In
this view, the addictive function of this product is a matter of its bad luck for the customers.
Managing luck of innovations
By ‘luck management’ or ‘managing luck of innovations’ I mean the methodologies and
practices which aim at increasing the chances of success for innovations and decreasing
their risks (risk of their failure and other risks). As this section argues, the normative
assumptions may divergently specify the goals, methods and moral boundaries of luck
management.
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If normative assumptions may divergently specify success of innovations, they can
indicate various aims of managing luck of innovations. For example, according to
ethical egoism, individuals and groups follow their interests in setting these goals. The-
ories of normative relativism may indicate various groups that should decide about these
aims. For example, ‘the organisation and interested parties’ (D 4) or ‘customers’ (D 5) can
determine the value, which innovation should promote. Consequently, their value prefer-
ences decide the aims of innovation management. The assumption of normative absolut-
ism does not alter such aims but (as the previous sections of this study argue), it does set
some additional requirements: Firstly, innovation management should give primacy to
satisfying real needs over apparent needs. Secondly, innovation management should
not aim at satisfying the (apparent) needs, in which satisfaction destroys the principal
good (which theories of absolutism variously define). Thirdly, this position usually
excludes ethical egoism and requires considering the interests of all people.
Decisions of luck management require knowledge about the chances and risks of
innovation. As some authors notice, predictions are ethically neutral when they relate
to the possibility of facts. However, if the forecast relates to values (when it is about
their probability), it ceases to be value-neutral. To identify probability, one should evalu-
ate it by distinguishing more precious goals and possibilities from less precious goals and
possibilities (Anderson 1995; Brown 2010; Coughlin 1991; Davila and Epstein 2014;
Enderle and Murphy 2015; Fried, Knox Lovell, and Schmidt 2008; Hall and Winsten
1959; Hanekamp 2007; Mintzberg 1982; Minus 1993; Moran 2016; Segerstrom 1990; Seg-
nestam Larsson and Brandsen 2016; Sen 1977, 1988, 1995; Stiglitz 2014; Walshe 2009;
Wight 2017; Zhou 2005). As some conceptions of idealised design and risk management
suggest (Ackoff, Magidson, and Addison 2006; Ericson and Doyle 2003; Frenkel,
Hommel, and Rudolf 2004), the value of chances and risks is the proportion between
the likelihood of a possibility and the rank of values it can undermine or foster. I call
this proportion ‘the principle of moral luck’. According to this principle, the higher
the value is, the chance of its realisation is more precious; whereas, the lower the value
is, the risk of its destruction is more permissible than the risk of destroying the higher
value; whereby the low chances of promoting the higher value may be the same or
more precious than the high chances of promoting a lower value. The principle of
moral luck may justify taking a high risk of annihilating lower values for a small
chance of protecting some high value. For example, internet technologies and a multi-
tude of other innovations originate from military research in the United States. Had
this endeavours not been driven by a stark interest in national security, work on these
innovations might have been abandoned due to the high costs and risk of failure. There-
fore, normative assumptions play a vital role in analysing opportunities and risks, which
is a vital part of luck management and the principle of moral luck guides some processes
of selecting the projects of innovations to be financed and implemented.
Normative assumptions may also specify some moral boundaries of managing luck by
advertising campaigns, which increase the demand on the market for an innovative
product or service (Barnes, Blake, and Pinder 2009). According to pure normative rela-
tivism (without any additional deontological assumptions), there is nothing wrong with
persuasion which alters the preferences of customers by modifying and creating their
needs and value preferences. Subsequently, their new preferences acquire the term of
‘needs’, and purchasing decisions are called ‘fulfilment of needs’. In the context of
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absolutism, the permissibility of such persuasion is conditional. It is morally acceptable
if it does not lead to the destruction of the principal good, such as the development of
an individual (eudaemonia); otherwise, the persuasion turns into a morally wrong
manipulation, according to the theories of eudemonism (Blecker et al. 2006; Donohue
2006).
Likewise, some representatives of normative relativism present a critique of manipu-
lation. For example, Sartre (especially in the later period of his works) distinguished auth-
entic needs from illusory needs. Non-authentic needs are the products of manipulation,
which is morally wrong. However, to evaluate manipulation, he adopts the deontological
(absolutist) assumption that freedom of individuals is the intrinsic and principal good
(Anderson 2002).
Moral responsibility for luck and the principle of control
The problem of moral luck is discussed in the literature as a challenge for our under-
standing of moral responsibility. Moral luck suggests, for instance, that the consequences
of actions can taint the moral status (viz. moral responsibility) of the perpetrator despite
having been beyond her control. Thus, someone can become worthy of praise, criticism,
reward or punishment for consequences of her actions (Athanassoulis 2005; Nagel 1979;
Nelkin 2019; Williams 1981). This kind of responsibility may relate to moral values (of
moral rightness or wrongness). This concern for moral responsibility can also be ident-
ified in realms that are not straightforwardly moral such as innovation, for example,
when innovators are praised for innovation successes.
Modern philosophers, who discuss the problem of moral luck – Thomas Nagel and
BernardWilliams – assume a close and intuitive connection between moral responsibility
and control, standardly characterised as follows: ‘We are morally assessable only to the
extent that what we are assessed for depends on factors under our control’ (Nelkin
2019). This control principle specifies the strict and intuitive meaning or ‘moral respon-
sibility’ but also suggests the existence of a paradox: Agents should be assessed only for
things within their control, but they are factually judged, for instance, for the conse-
quences of actions that were beyond their control (Nagel 1979, 34; Sand and Jongsma
2020). The same paradox seems to emerge in the non-moral realm – one can question,
whether innovators are morally responsible (praiseworthy) for the success, when it was
beyond their control (Grinbaum and Groves 2013; Moore 1999; Owen and Pansera 2019;
Pavie 2014; Sand 2018b, 2020a, 2020b; Sand and Jongsma 2020).
Some authors attempt to solve the aforementioned paradox by rejecting the control
principle (Browne 1992) or showing that one can explain moral luck without assuming
the control principle (Walker 1991). They assume that agents can be morally responsible
despite total lack of control and intent, for example, in the cases of quasi-parental or col-
lective responsibility (Grinbaum and Groves 2013). Quasi-parental responsibility for
technological development consists of the obligation to care for someone or something
(Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 130–132). In this meaning of ‘responsibility’ innovators are
responsible for their innovations like parents for their children. This responsibility is the
‘duty,’ or ‘virtue’ (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 131). It is not moral responsibility in the
aforementioned strict sense, although the quasi-parental responsibility may flow from
this moral responsibility.
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Similarly in the case, of collective responsibility, one has to do with the situation,
where the guilt of some members of the group is ‘attributed to [all] individuals who
compose the group’ (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 133) In this context the term ‘respon-
sibility’ means ‘political responsibility’ (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 133). It can desig-
nate various phenomena, like (a) feeling of pride or shame for actions of other
members of the group, (b) the obligation to help those who have suffered as a result
of the group’s injustice or (c) the obligation to reimburse the harms caused by the injus-
tice of the group (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 132–134). Accordingly, all members of a
group may have some collective responsibilities, which may follow from the actions of
some other member. However, these responsibilities may be distinct phenomena from
moral responsibility in the strict sense: someone can have some responsibility without
being guilty or praiseworthy for the reason of this responsibility.
Another way towards a solution of this problem demands a stronger adherence to the
principle (Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Latus 2000; Nelkin 2019; Richards 1986; Wolf 2001):
Even if it barely happens, one should not praise or blame agents for consequences which
they did not control. Furthermore, if an agent partially controlled an event, then she
might also be partially responsible for it. Indeed, the principle of control suggests that
control and responsibility may be gradual. Namely, moral responsibility for the conse-
quences is proportional to the level of agential control and inversely proportional to
the agent’s epistemic (Rudy-Hiller 2018) and control (Nagel 1979, 24–38) limits over
the consequences. These are the same limits which are constitutive to luck, and this
study has already indicated them. Thus, they may decrease the level, but they do not
always absolve decision-makers from their moral responsibility for the consequences
of their actions. Consequently, according to the principle, only the agent who had absol-
utely no control over the consequences of the action, for example, when one invents or
discovers something by pure luck, is exempt from morally responsible. However, con-
cerning innovations, pure luck is rare because innovators are not without tools to
influence the future, investigate possibilities and their probability. For example, they
may test an innovation, analyse its risks and opportunities by statistical and mathematical
methods (Zimmer-Merkle and Fleischer 2017).
Moreover, agents (people or organisations) may be morally responsible for their lack
of awareness when they do not attain available knowledge about the opportunities and
risks of action (Rudy-Hiller 2018). Such are cases of wilful ignorance. For example,
when a pharmaceutical company launches a medication without testing its effects prop-
erly, the lack of awareness does not absolve the producers from moral responsibility for
the failure or harmful effects of the product. In this case, the company could have some
control over the effects but abstains from controlling them.
In the context of discussions about the doctrine of double effect, some authors dis-
tinguish between direct and indirect intentions and control, which are the condition
for moral responsibility (Anscombe 1982; Dworkin 1990; Hills 2003; McIntyre 2014).
The discussion alludes to the observation (of Thomas Aquinas and the medieval scholas-
tics) that the aim of (intended by) the agent (lat. finis operantis) can differ from the goal of
actions (lat. finis operis), which is determined by the causal ‘inner mechanism’ of activi-
ties. According to this distinction, one directly intends some consequence by trying to
cause it and wishing it to happen. The agent indirectly intends (wills) some consequences
(without directly intending them), by planning and conducting the action that causes
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them by its ‘inner mechanism’ which is or can be known to the agent. In this case, the
agent can have some indirect control over the consequences of her action by controlling
its ‘inner mechanism,’ however, without directly intending them (Anscombe 1982;
Dworkin 1990; Hills 2003; McIntyre 2014). There may be many ways of indirectly intend-
ing a consequence. For example, the idea of indirect willing and control may explain
cases of quasi-parental and collective moral responsibility – when agents who bear it,
have some indirect control over the situation or indirectly will it. Parents can be
morally (not only legally) responsible for the misbehaviour of their child when they
could have prevented it or have contributed to the fault by making mistakes in the
upbringing of children like encouraging them to unethical behaviour. Parents may
have no such control in each moment, but when they sometimes have it, and it is
sufficient to influence decisions of the child, they may be (partially) morally responsible
for the misbehaviour. Similarly, members of a group may carry the collective moral
responsibility for the injustice, which is not their fault, when they indirectly intend it.
For example, an agent can be responsible for the injustice of other people, when she
profits from this injustice and refuses to give back its benefits to its victims. Alexei Grin-
baum and Christopher Groves seem to imply the idea of indirect willing by summing up
the position of Hannah Arendt about the collective responsibility in the following way:
‘She did not ask whether an individual is good but whether his or her conduct is good
for the world s/he lives in’ (2013, 132).
Another example: The agent may indirectly intend some consequence by intending
some kind of consequence without precisely anticipating the eventual guise and shape
of that consequence. Alexander Fleming, for instance, had previously observed antiseptic
agents and was on the lookout for similar agents: While one cannot say that he intended
to find Penicillin, he certainly intended to find a chemical agent with similar properties
(Gillies 2015). Thus, the discovery of Penicillin was not purely accidental, although it
involved an enormous degree of luck (Sand 2020b). Thus, researchers might pursue
finding structurally similar phenomena to those eventually found and be morally respon-
sible for the success or failure, as they controlled the direction and manner of the
investigation.
Responsibility and ethics
According to the principle of moral luck, innovation managers should select ideas and
solutions, which have sufficient opportunity to protect and promote values, and which
are high enough to make the investment worthy of its costs and risks. To decide to under-
take the costs and risks of solving the problem, one should first evaluate its importance.
This evaluation is the preliminary step of managing the luck of innovation. By assessing
the importance of a problem, one addresses some hierarchy of values and normative
assumptions. If the problem is worth solving, one may investigate the chances and
risks of its possible solutions, according to the principle of moral luck. When normative
assumptions are arbitrary, they pose a threat to the organisation and society as a whole,
because they may lead towards the arbitrary underestimation or overestimation of
opportunities and risks (Jacko 2016; Mintzberg 1982). For instance, the ‘innovation
paradox’ takes place when large organisations overestimate their status quo. By conse-
quence, they marginalise the chances of revolutionary innovations, or abandon them
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and prefer less risky evolutionary innovations (Davila and Epstein 2014) or pseudo-inno-
vations (Mensch 1979). Organisations need the appropriate hierarchy of values to evalu-
ate opportunities and risks.
Normative assumptions are not conclusions of reasoning; they are its premises. They
do not have scientific proof. Nevertheless, they do not need to be arbitrary. One may
choose normative assumptions in a more or less responsible manner in terms of meth-
odological rationality, as the former section indicates. One may investigate them by phi-
losophical methods concerning the consistency of these assumptions (Dorsey 2006), their
compatibility with experience (Chappell 2009) and in terms of the conditions for rational
choice between normative assumptions (Jacko 2018; Kant 2010; Kotarbiński 1958).
Since normative assumptions play a crucial role in responsible decision-making about
innovations and philosophical methods are best suited to examine these premises, phi-
losophical research may go with the theory and practice of innovation management in
three respects. Firstly, philosophical ethics offers some methods to investigate the justifi-
cation of normative assumptions. It does not offer scientific proof, but it facilitates the
partial justification by employing the phenomenological and logical analysis of the
(internal and external) consistency of normative assumptions. It may also falsify some
systems of normative assumptions by detecting its (formal or material) incongruity. Sec-
ondly, ethics may operationalise normative assumptions by specifying their impact on
practice. Thirdly, analytical methods of philosophy investigate a variety of normative
assumptions. In this way, ethics can fulfil a heuristic role in specifying a multi-faceted
perspective of perceiving values and facilitating the observation of problems and their
solutions in a broader (‘humanistic’) perspective, not only in quantitative terms or pos-
sibilities of some particular profit. In this way, ethics may present a range of possible
options when establishing a social consensus on the values, which may guide innovation
management (Coughlin 1991; Cowan and Rizzo 1995; Gustafson and Johnson 1989;
Piderit 1993; Pruzan 1998; Segerstrom 1990; Wight 2015; Zsolnai 2002).
Conclusions
The study presented a spectrum of answers to its key questions (What does ‘luck’mean in
theories of innovation management?, What is luck in the practice of innovation manage-
ment?). Possible answers have been outlined based on the assumptions of various norma-
tive theories including normative relativism, anti-relativism in metaethics, ethical
egoism, universalism, personalism, liberalism, utilitarianism and eudemonism. The con-
ceptual analyses showed how these premises specify the idea of the success of innovations
in terms of their utility and efficiency. The present analyses uncovered the relation
between the idea of success and the definition of luck and how normative assumptions
affect its meaning. The study argued that the value-neutral (economic, descriptive) con-
ceptions of success, utility, efficiency and luck are general and open for various interpret-
ations. Conceptualisations become ethically relevant when guiding decisions relating to
innovations. The analyses demonstrated the heuristic role of normative assumptions –
they elucidate qualitative aspects of changes and their value. The study outlined how nor-
mative assumptions determine the goals and moral limits of managing the luck of inno-
vations, while also the method to identify innovations and manage their luck. Lastly, I
presented the role of philosophical investigations for selecting normative assumptions.
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The study opens a perspective for further research of the roles that normative assump-
tions come to play in the theory of innovation management and for empirical investi-
gations about the impact of value preferences on decisions concerning the financing
and implementation of innovations or their projects.
Note
1. Some thinkers do not explicitly specify innovations in terms of success. For example, Joseph
A. Schumpeter (1983, 65–95) writes about ‘new combination’ of new or existing knowledge,
resources, equipment, and other factors. However, in the context of his theory of ‘economic
waves,’ this kind of novelty may get some interpretation in terms of success: An innovation
(as opposed to pseudo-innovations) becomes successful when it contributes to the technical
or economic development (Keklik 2018; Kleinknecht 1987; Mensch 1979; Walshe 2009).
Acknowledgements
I would like to thankMartin Sand and the anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Responsible Inno-
vation for all suggestions, which helped me to improve the paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Jan Franciszek Jacko is an associate professor at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. His current
research interest is in rational choice theory, business ethics and applied philosophy.
ORCID
Jan Franciszek Jacko http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5654-1039
References
Ackoff, Russell Lincoln, Jason Magidson, and Herbert J. Addison. 2006. Idealised Design: Creating
an Organization’s Future. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Alchian, Armen A. 1953. “The Meaning of Utility Measurement.” The American Economic Review
43: 26–50.
Anderson, Elizabeth. 1995. Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Anderson, Carl. 1997. “Values-Based Management.” Journal of Business Ethics 50 (1): 97–103.
Anderson, Thomas C. 2002. “Beyond Sartre’s Ethics of Authenticity.” Journal of the British Society
for Phenomenology 33 (2): 138–154. doi:10.1080/00071773.2002.11007376.
Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret. 1982. “Action, Intention, and ‘Double Effect’.”
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56: 12–25.
Athanassoulis, N. 2005. Morality, Moral Luck and Responsibility: Fortune’s Web. New York:
Springer.
Baiman, Ron P. 2016. The Morality of Radical Economics: Ghost Curve Ideology and the Value
Neutral Aspect of Neoclassical Economics. Illinois: Springer.
S122 J. F. JACKO
Barbera, Salvador, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, eds. 1998. Handbook of Utility Theory:
Volume 1: Principles. Dortreht: Springer Science & Business Media.
Barnes, Cindy, Helen Blake, and David Pinder. 2009. Creating and Delivering Your Value
Proposition: Managing Customer Experience for Profit. London: Kogan Page Publishers.
Bechtold, Ulrike, Leo Capari, and Niklas Gudowsky. 2017. “Futures of Ageing and Technology –
Comparing Different Actors’ Prospective Views.” Journal of Responsible Innovation 4 (2):
157–176. doi:10.1080/23299460.2017.1360721.
Bernthal, Wilmar F. 1962. “Value Perspectives in Management Decisions.” Academy of
Management Journal 5 (3): 190–196. doi:10.2307/254469.
Blecker, Thorsten, Gerhard Friedrich, Bernd Kaluza, Nizar Abdelkafi, and Gerold Kreutler. 2006.
Information and Management Systems for Product Customization. Boston, MA: Springer
Science & Business Media.
Bodden, Valerie. 2019. The Story of Coca Cola. Mankato: The Creative Company.
Brandt, R. B. 1967. “Ethical Relativism.” In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by P. Edwards,
3–4, 75–78. New York: McMillan.
Brink, David O. 2014. “Aristotelian Naturalism in the History of Ethics.” Journal of the History of
Philosophy 52: 813–833. doi:10.1353/hph.2014.0074.
Brown, Michael F. 2008. “Cultural Relativism 2.0.” Current Anthropology 49 (3): 363–383. doi:10.
1086/529261.
Brown, Marvin T. 2010. “The Ethics of Economic Systems.” In Civilising the Economy, 178–192.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511844737.015.
Browne, Brynmor. 1992. “A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck.” The Philosophical Quarterly
42: 343–356.
Brunk, Conrad G., Lawrence Haworth, and Brenda Lee. 2006. Value Assumptions in Risk
Assessment: A Case Study of the Alachlor Controversy. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press.
Carroll, Archie B. 2000. “Ethical Challenges for Business in the New Millennium: Corporate Social
Responsibility and Models of Management Morality.” Business Ethics Quarterly 10 (1): 33–42.
doi:10.2307/3857692.
CBC (The Conference Board of Canada). 2019. “Innovation Defined.” Centre for Business
Innovation. 2019. https://www.conferenceboard.ca/cbi/innovation.aspx.
Chappell, Timothy. 2009. Ethics and Experience: Life Beyond Moral Theory. Durham, NC: Acumen
Publishing. doi:10.1017/UPO9781844654161.
Collins, Jim, and Morten T. Hansen. 2011. Great by Choice: Uncertainty, Chaos and Luck - Why
Some Thrive Despite Them All. London: Random House.
Coughlin, Richard M., ed. 1991. Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-
Economics. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
Cowan, Robin, and Mario J. Rizzo, eds. 1995. Profits and Morality. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Crisp, Roger. 2016. “Well-Being.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N.
Zalta. Summer. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/well-being/.
Cunningham, Tom, and Jonathan de Quidt. 2016. “Implicit Preferences Inferred from Choice.”
5704. CESifo Working Paper Series. CESifo. https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_5704.html.
Daly, Herman E., and Kenneth N. Townsend, eds. 1996. Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology,
Ethics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Davila, Tony, and Marc Epstein. 2014. The Innovation Paradox: Why Good Businesses Kill
Breakthroughs and How They Can Change. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
https://books.google.pl/books?id=W8UlAgAAQBAJ.
Dennis, Ken, ed. 2012. Rationality in Economics: Alternative Perspectives. New York: Springer
Science & Business Media.
Dickel, Sascha, and Jan-Felix Schrape. 2017. “The Renaissance of Techno-Utopianism as a
Challenge for Responsible Innovation.” Journal of Responsible Innovation 4 (2): 289–294.
doi:10.1080/23299460.2017.1310523.
JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION S123
Donohue, Julie. 2006. “A History of Drug Advertising: The Evolving Roles of Consumers and
Consumer Protection.” The Milbank Quarterly 84 (4): 659–699. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0009.
2006.00464.x.
Dorsey, Dale. 2006. “A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics.” Philosophical Studies 127: 493–523.
doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7828-8.
Driver, Julia. 2014. “The History of Utilitarianism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited by Edward N. Zalta. Winter. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history/.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1990. “The ‘Double Counting’ Objection.” In Utilitarianism and Its Critics,
edited by Jonatan Glover, 103–106. New York: Macmillan, Collier.
Eldred, Michael. 2011. “Value, Justice – Aristotle, Adam Smith, Karl Marx.” Collected Writings.
http://www.arte-fact.org/untpltcl/exchvljs.html.
Enderle, Georges, and Patrick E. Murphy. 2015. Ethical Innovation in Business and the Economy.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Ericson, Richard Victor, and Aaron Doyle, eds. 2003. Risk and Morality. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Fischer, John Martin, and Mark Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral
Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fleurbaey, Marc. 2016. “Economics and Economic Justice.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Winter. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/economic-justice/.
Flynn, Thomas. 2013. “Jean-Paul Sartre.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta. Fall. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/sartre/.
Frankelius, Per. 2009. “Questioning Two Myths in Innovation Literature.” The Journal of High
Technology Management Research 20 (1): 40–51. doi:10.1016/j.hitech.2009.02.002.
Frankena, William K. 1973. Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. http://www.ditext.com/
frankena/ethics.html.
Freeman, R. Edward, Daniel R. Gilbert Jr., and Edwin Hartman. 1988. “Values and the
Foundations of Strategic Management.” Journal of Business Ethics 7 (11): 821–834. doi:10.
1007/BF00383045.
Frenkel, Michael, Ulrich Hommel, and Markus Rudolf, eds. 2004. Risk Management: Challenge
and Opportunity. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media.
Fried, Harold O., C. A. Knox Lovell, and Shelton S. Schmidt, eds. 2008. The Measurement of
Productive Efficiency and Productivity Growth. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press.
Garnett, A. Campbell. 1944. “Relativism and Absolutism in Ethics.” Ethics 54 (3): 186–199.
Gillies, Donald. 2015. “Serendipity and Chance in Scientific Discovery: Policy Implications for
Global Society.” In The Handbook of Global Science, Technology, and Innovation, edited by
Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti, 525–539. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Gowans, Chris. 2012. “Moral Relativism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/moral-relativism/.
Grinbaum, Alexei, and Christopher Groves. 2013. “What Is “Responsible” About Responsible
Innovation? Understanding the Ethical Issues.” In Responsible Innovation: Managing the
Responsible Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society, edited by Richard Owen, John
Bessant, and Maggy Heintz, 119–142. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/
9781118551424.ch7.
Gustafson, James M., and Elmer W. Johnson. 1989. “Efficiency, Morality, and Managerial
Effectiveness.” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 42 (7): 9–28. doi:10.
2307/3824351.
Haimes, Yacov Y. 2015. Risk Modeling, Assessment, and Management. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley &
Sons.
Hall, Margaret, and Christopher Winsten. 1959. “The Ambiguous Notion of Efficiency.” The
Economic Journal 69 (273): 71–86. doi:10.2307/2227823.
Hanekamp, Gerd, ed. 2007. Business Ethics of Innovation. Berlin: Springer Science & Business
Media.
S124 J. F. JACKO
Hansson, Sven Ove, and Till Grüne-Yanoff. 2018. “Preferences.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Summer. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/preferences/.
Heter, T. Storm. 2006. Sartre’s Ethics of Engagement. Authenticity and the Civic Virtue. New York:
A&C Black.
Hills, Alison. 2003. “Defending Double Effect.” Philosophical Studies 116 (2): 133–152. doi:10.
1023/B:PHIL.0000005744.80837.65.
Hollis, Martin, and Steven Lukes, eds. 1982. Rationality and Relativism. Cambridge: MIT Press.
IAIP (The International Association of Innovation Professionals). n.d. “Definitions. What is
Innovation (ISO).” IAOIP Innovation Measurement Standard Challenge. Accessed December
2, 2019. https://iaoip.spigit.com/innovationmeasurement/Page/Definitions.
“Innovation”. n.d. Business Dictionary. Accessed April 30, 2017. http://www.businessdictionary.
com/definition/innovation.html.
Jacko, Jan Franciszek. 2016. “Security of Organisations and Methodological Rationality of Their
Members.” Education of Economists and Managers. Problems. Innovations. Projects 4 (42): 9–
28. doi:10.5604/01.3001.0009.5484.
Jacko, Jan Franciszek. 2018. “Moral Conditions for Methodologically Rational Decisions.” In
Rationality and Decision Making, 209–223. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences
and the Humanities 111. doi:10.1163/9789004359475_012.
Jarvie, I. C. 1983. “Rationality and Relativism.” In Thinking About Society: Theory and Practice, 50–
69. Dortrecht: R. Reidel Publishing Company. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 93.
doi:10.1007/978-94-009-5424-3_4.
Jayapalan, N. 1999. Aristotle. New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Dist.
Jonsson, Ivar. 2016. The Political Economy of Innovation and Entrepreneurship: From Theories to
Practice. London: Routledge.
Kant, Immanuel. 2010. The Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by T. K. Abbott. Adelaide: The
University of Adelaide.
Keeney, Ralph L. 1996. “The Role of Values in Risk Management.” The ANNALS of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 545 (1): 126–134. doi:10.1177/0002716296545001013.
Keklik, Mümtaz. 2018. Schumpeter, Innovation and Growth: Long-Cycle Dynamics in the Post-
WWII American Manufacturing Industries. New York: Routledge.
Kelly, Paul. 2005. Liberalism. Cambridge: Polity.
Kleinknecht, A. 1987. “Basic Innovations, Radically New Products, Major Innovations: An
Assessment of Recent Research.” In Innovation Patterns in Crisis and Prosperity:
Schumpeter’s Long Cycle Reconsidered, edited by A. Kleinknecht, 57–75. London: Palgrave
Macmillan UK.
Kotarbiński, Tadeusz. 1958. “Zasady Etyki Niezależnej.” Studia Filozoficzne 1: 3–13.
Kraut, Richard. 2016. “Aristotle’s Ethics.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta. Spring. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/aristotle-ethics/.
Kuipers, Benjamin. 1994. Qualitative Reasoning: Modelling and Simulation with Incomplete
Knowledge. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Latus, Andrew. 2000. “Moral and Epistemic Luck.” Journal of Philosophical Research 25: 149–172.
Lösch, Andreas, Armin Grunwald, Martin Meister, and Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer. 2019. “Technology
Assessment of Socio-Technical Futures – A Discussion Paper.” In Socio-Technical Futures
Shaping the Present: Empirical Examples and Analytical Challenges, edited by Andreas Lösch,
Armin Grunwald, Martin Meister, and Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer, 285–305. Wiesbaden: Springer
Nature.
Lösch, Andreas, Reinhard Heil, and Christoph Schneider. 2017. “Responsibilisation Through
Visions.” Journal of Responsible Innovation 4 (2): 138–156. doi:10.1080/23299460.2017.1360717.
Luetge, Christoph, and Johanna Jauernig, eds. 2013. Business Ethics and Risk Management.
Dortrecht: Springer Science & Business Media.
MacRae, Duncan. 1973. “Normative Assumptions in the Study of Public Choice.” Public Choice 16
(1): 27–41. doi:10.1007/BF01718804.
JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION S125
Marseille, Elliot, and James G. Kahn. 2019. “Utilitarianism and the Ethical Foundations of Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis in Resource Allocation for Global Health.” Philosophy, Ethics, and
Humanities in Medicine 14 (5). doi:10.1186/s13010-019-0074-7.
Matsumoto, Mitsutaka, Yasushi Umeda, Keijiro Masui, and Shinichi Fukushige, eds. 2012. Design
for Innovative Value Towards a Sustainable Society: Proceedings of EcoDesign 2011: 7th
International Symposium on Environmentally Conscious Design and Inverse Manufacturing.
Dortrecht: Springer Science & Business Media.
McIntyre, Alison. 2014. “Doctrine of Double Effect.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited by Edward N. Zalta. Winter. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/double-effect/.
Melé, Domènec. 2008. “Corporate Social Responsibility Theories.” In The Oxford Handbook of
Corporate Social Responsibility, edited by Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten, Abagail McWilliams,
Jeremy Moon, and Donald Siegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199211593.003.0003
Mensch, Gerhard. 1979. Stalemate in Technology: Innovations Overcome the Depression.
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company.
Mintzberg, Henry. 1982. “A Note on That Dirty Word ‘Efficiency’.” Interfaces 12 (5): 101–105.
doi:10.1287/inte.12.5.101.
Minus, Paul M., ed. 1993. The Ethics of Business in a Global Economy. Boston, MA: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Moore, Michael S. 1999. “Causation and Responsibility.” In Responsibility, edited by Jeffrey Paul,
Ellen Frankel Paul, and Fred D. Miller Jr., 1–51. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511524103.
Moran, S. 2016. Ethical Ripples of Creativity and Innovation. New York: Springer.
Nagel, Thomas. 1979. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Navarro, Jesús. 2019. “Luck and Risk.” Metaphilosophy 50 (1–2): 63–75. doi:10.1111/meta.
12340.
Nelkin, Dana K. 2019. “Moral Luck.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward
N. Zalta. Summer. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2019/entries/moral-luck/.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). 2019. “Concepts for
Measuring Innovation.” In Oslo Manual 2018. Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using
Data on Innovation, 4th ed., 43–64. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
science-and-technology/oslo-manual-2018/concepts-for-measuring-innovation_
9789264304604-5-en.
Owen, Richard, and Mario Pansera. 2019. “Responsible Innovation and Responsible Research and
Innovation.” In Handbook on Science and Public Policy, edited by Dagmar Simon, Stefan
Kuhlmann, Julia Stamm, and Weert Canzler, 26–48. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Parnell, J. A., and E. B. Dent. 2009. “The Role of Luck in the Strategy-Performance Relationship.”
Management Decision 47 (6): 1000–1021. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2331233.
Parsons, Simon. 2001. Qualitative Methods for Reasoning Under Uncertainty. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Pavie, Xavier. 2014. Responsible Innovation: From Concept To Practice. New Jersey: World
Scientific.
Perrin, Burt. 2002. “How to — and How Not to — Evaluate Innovation.” Evaluation 8 (1): 13–28.
doi:10.1177/1358902002008001514.
Piderit, John J. 1993. The Ethical Foundations of Economics. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press.
Pruzan, Peter. 1998. “From Control to Values-Based Management and Accountability.” Journal of
Business Ethics 17 (13): 1379–1394. doi:10.1023/A:1006079110633.
Raman, Sujatha, AlisonMohr, Richard Helliwell, Barbara Ribeiro, Orla Shortall, Robert Smith, and
Kate Millar. 2015. “Integrating Social and Value Dimensions Into Sustainability Assessment of
Lignocellulosic Biofuels.” Biomass and Bioenergy 82: 49–62. doi:10.1016/j.biombioe.2015.04.
022.
S126 J. F. JACKO
Richards, Norvin. 1986. “Luck and Desert.” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and
Philosophy XCV (378): 198–209.
Roa, Floriano C. 2007. Business Ethics and Social Responsibility. Manila: Rex Bookstore.
Rudy-Hiller, Fernando. 2018. “The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility.” In The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Fall. Metaphysics Research
Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moral-
responsibility-epistemic/.
Sand, Martin. 2018a. “A Humanist Ethics of Innovation.” In Futures, Visions, and Responsibility:
An Ethics of Innovation, edited by Martin Sand, 5–46. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.
Technikzukünfte, Wissenschaft Und Gesellschaft / Futures of Technology, Science and
Society. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-22684-8_2.
Sand, Martin. 2018b. Futures, Visions, and Responsibility: An Ethics of Innovation. Karlsruhe:
Springer.
Sand, Martin. 2020a. “Luck as a Challenge for the Responsible Governance of Science and
Technology.” Campaign Page Builder. https://think.taylorandfrancis.com/journal-of-responsible-
innovation-luck-as-a-challenge-for-the-responsible-governance-of-science-and-technology/.
Sand, Martin. 2020b. “Did Alexander Fleming Deserve the Nobel Prize?” Science and Engineering
Ethics 26 (2): 899–919. doi:10.1007/s11948-019-00149-5.
Sand, Martin, and Karin Jongsma. 2020. “Scientists’ Views on (Moral) Luck.” Journal of
Responsible Innovation. doi:10.1080/23299460.2020.1799623.
Schomberg, Rene Von, and Jonathan Hankins, eds. 2019. International Handbook on Responsible
Innovation. A Global Resource. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Schumpeter, J. A. 1983. The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital,
Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle. 10th ed. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Segerstrom, P. S. 1990. “Moral Efficiency.” Social Choice and Welfare 7 (2): 109–129. doi:10.1007/
BF01560578.
Segnestam Larsson, Ola, and Taco Brandsen. 2016. “The Implicit Normative Assumptions of
Social Innovation Research: Embracing the Dark Side.” In Social Innovations in the Urban
Context, edited by Taco Brandsen, Sandro Cattacin, Adalbert Evers, and Annette Zimmer,
293–302. Heidelberg: Springer. Nonprofit and Civil Society Studies. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-
21551-8_24.
Sen, Amartya K. 1977. “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4). https://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/cr-cridis/
documents/sen_on_TCR_rational_fools.pdf.
Sen, Amartya K. 1988. On Ethics and Economics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. https://
alvaroaltamirano.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/amartya-sen-on-ethics-and-economics.pdf.
Sen, Amartya K. 1990. “Rights Consequentialism.” In Utilitarianism and Its Critics, edited by
Jonatan Glover, 111–118. New York: Macmillan, Collier.
Sen, Amartya K. 1995. “Rationality and Social Choice.” American Economic Review 85 (1): 1.
Shaver, Robert. 2019. “Egoism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N.
Zalta. Spring. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/spr2019/entries/egoism/.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2014. “How Do YouMeasure the Value of Innovation?”World Economic Forum.
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/03/measure-value-innovation/.
Swoyer, Chris. 2014. “Relativism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. Spring 2014
Edition, edited by E. N. Zalta. Stanford. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/
relativism/.
Veatch, Henry Babcock. 2003. Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics.
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Verbeek, Peter-Paul. 2011. Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the Morality of
Things. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Walker, Margaret Urban. 1991. “Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency.” Metaphilosophy
22: 14–12.
JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION S127
Walshe, Kieran. 2009. “Pseudoinnovation: The Development and Spread of Healthcare Quality
Improvement Methodologies.” International Journal for Quality in Health Care 21 (3): 153–
159. doi:10.1093/intqhc/mzp012.
Westacott, Emrys. 2012. “Moral Relativism.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.
utm.edu/moral-re/.
White, Mark D. 2012. “Value in Economics: Accentuate the Qualitative, but Don’t Eliminate the
Quantitative.” In Value: Sources and Readings on a Key Concept of the Globalised World, edited
by Ivo Gennaro, 331–347. Leiden: Brill.
Wight, Jonathan B. 2015. Ethics in Economics: An Introduction to Moral Frameworks. Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press.
Wight, Jonathan B. 2017. “The Ethics Behind Efficiency.” The Journal of Economic Education 48
(1): 15–26. doi:10.1080/00220485.2016.1252294.
Williams, Bernard. 1981. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Williams, Thomas D., and Jan Olof Bengtsson. 2016. “Personalism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Summer. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/
entries/personalism/.
Witztum, Amos, and Jeffrey T. Young. 2013. “Utilitarianism and the Role of Utility in Adam
Smith.” The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 20 (4): 572–602. doi:10.
1080/09672567.2011.592846.
Wolf, Susan. 2001. “The Moral of Moral Luck.” Philosophic Exchange 31: 4–19.
Yang, Di. 2019. “What’s Wrong with Modal Conceptions of Luck and Risk.” Erkenntnis, May.
doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00131-4.
Zhou, Qi. 2005. “The Evolution of Efficiency Principle: From Utilitarianism to Wealth
Maximization.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 870748. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research
Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=870748.
Zimmer-Merkle, Silke, and Torsten Fleischer. 2017. “Eclectic, Random, Intuitive? Technology
Assessment, RRI, and Their Use of History.” Journal of Responsible Innovation 4 (2): 217–
233. doi:10.1080/23299460.2017.1338105.
Zimmerman, Michael J. 2001. The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Zimmerman, Michael J. 2019/2015. “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Spring. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/.
Zsolnai, László. 2002. Ethics in the Economy: Handbook of Business Ethics. Oxford: Peter Lang.
S128 J. F. JACKO
